Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
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Publication:2288975
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1086905 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1754580 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
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- Big data in humanitarian supply chain networks: a resource dependence perspective
- Modeling the values of private sector agents in multi-echelon Humanitarian supply chains
- How to increase the impact of disaster relief: a study of transportation rates, framework agreements and product distribution
- Game-theoretic frameworks for epidemic spreading and human decision-making: a review
- Fleet coordination in decentralized Humanitarian operations funded by earmarked donations
- Modelling beneficiaries' choice in disaster relief logistics
- Two-set inequalities for the binary knapsack polyhedra
- Measuring the impact of donations at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) amid the COVID-19 pandemic
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