Game-theoretic frameworks for epidemic spreading and human decision-making: a review

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Publication:2128952

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00428-0zbMATH Open1489.91042arXiv2106.00214OpenAlexW3166875891MaRDI QIDQ2128952FDOQ2128952


Authors: Yunhan Huang, Quanyan Zhu Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 22 April 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: This review presents and reviews various solved and open problems in developing, analyzing, and mitigating epidemic spreading processes under human decision-making. We provide a review of a range of epidemic models and explain the pros and cons of different epidemic models. We exhibit the art of coupling epidemic models and decision models in the existing literature. {More specifically, we provide answers to fundamental questions in human decision-making amid epidemics, including what interventions to take to combat the disease, who are decision-makers, when to take interventions, and how to make interventions.} Among many decision models, game-theoretic models have become increasingly crucial in modeling human responses/behavior amid epidemics in the last decade. In this review, we motivate the game-theoretic approach to human decision-making amid epidemics. This review provides an overview of the existing literature by developing a multi-dimensional taxonomy, which categorizes existing literature based on multiple dimensions, including 1) types of games, such as differential games, stochastic games, evolutionary games, and static games; 2) types of interventions, such as social distancing, vaccination, quarantine, taking antidotes, etc.; 3) the types of decision-makers, such as individuals, adversaries, and central authorities at different hierarchical levels. A fine-grained dynamic game framework is proposed to capture the essence of game-theoretic decision-making amid epidemics. We showcase three representative {frameworks} with unique ways of integrating game-theoretic decision-making into the epidemic models from a vast body of literature. {Each of the three framework has a unique way of modeling, conducting analytical analysis, and deriving results.} In the end, we identify several main open problems and research gaps left to be addressed and filled.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.00214




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