Learning to mitigate epidemic risks: a dynamic population game approach

DOI10.1007/S13235-023-00529-4MaRDI QIDQ6204715zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Saverio Bolognani

Publication date 2 April 2024

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic population gameepidemic mitigationperturbed best response dynamicstestingvaccination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Epidemiology (92D30)

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• Game-Theoretic Vaccination Against Networked SIS Epidemics and Impacts of Human Decision-Making
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• Optimal individual strategies for influenza vaccines with imperfect efficacy and durability of protection
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
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• The mask game with multiple populations
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