Decentralized Protection Strategies Against SIS Epidemics in Networks

DOI10.1109/TCNS.2015.2426755MaRDI QIDQ5358476zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Stojan Trajanovski, Y. Hayel, Piet Van Mieghem, Eitan Altman, Huijuan Wang

Publication date 21 September 2017

Published in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1730

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Network protocols (68M12) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Abstract: Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.

Cited in

(14)

• Game-theoretic frameworks for epidemic spreading and human decision-making: a review
• A partially observable stochastic zero-sum game for a network epidemic control problem
• The mask game with multiple populations
• Dynamic games of social distancing during an epidemic: analysis of asymmetric solutions
• Epidemic spreading and equilibrium social distancing in heterogeneous networks
• Nash social distancing games with equity constraints: how inequality aversion affects the spread of epidemics
• An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
• Individual security, contagion, and network design
• Dynamic games for analyzing competition in the internet and in on-line social networks
• Potential game approach to virus attacks in network with general topology
• Optimizing intrusion detection systems placement against network virus spreading using a partially observable stochastic minimum-threat path game
• Learning to mitigate epidemic risks: a dynamic population game approach
• A network centrality game based on a compact representation of defender's belief for epidemic control
• Exploring centrality dynamics for epidemic control in complex networks: an asymmetrical centralities game approach

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