An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0284-4zbMATH Open1431.91089OpenAlexW2890976049WikidataQ129216974 ScholiaQ129216974MaRDI QIDQ2292109FDOQ2292109
Authors: Farzaneh Farhadi, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demosthenis Teneketzis, S. Jamaloddin Golestani
Publication date: 3 February 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0284-4
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Dynamic games (91A25) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cited In (4)
- Dynamic contract design for systemic cyber risk management of interdependent enterprise networks
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents
- Game-theoretic frameworks for epidemic spreading and human decision-making: a review
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