Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
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Publication:6135966
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1950653 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3206496 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
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