Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:414842
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009zbMath1238.68167OpenAlexW1971146758MaRDI QIDQ414842
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas W. Sandholm
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009
Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
Related Items
Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities, Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents, Expressive markets for donating to charities, An introduction to mechanized reasoning, When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures, Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Expressive markets for donating to charities
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Multiagent resource allocation in \(k\)-additive domains: preference representation and complexity
- Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
- CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
- Incentives in Teams
- Learning Theory
- Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions