Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009zbMath1238.68167OpenAlexW1971146758MaRDI QIDQ414842

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

representationexternalitiesexpressive markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items

Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities, Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents, Expressive markets for donating to charities, An introduction to mechanized reasoning, When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures, Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions

Uses Software

• CABOB

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Expressive markets for donating to charities
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Multiagent resource allocation in \(k\)-additive domains: preference representation and complexity
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Learning Theory
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions