Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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Publication:1290839
DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2501zbMATH Open1028.91539OpenAlexW2156477104MaRDI QIDQ1290839FDOQ1290839
Ennio Stacchetti, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu
Publication date: 28 January 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100795
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Multiproduct Duopolists
- Optimal Auction Design
- State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
- Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (59)
- Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities
- Informational hold up and intermediaries
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- How to sell in a sequential auction market
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- Selling information in competitive environments
- Bargaining and negative externalities
- Coordination and externalities
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
- Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
- Quasi-linear integrability: addendum
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Screening while controlling an externality
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
- The dynamic Vickrey auction
- Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
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