Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5135703 (Why is no real title available?)
- An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process
- Better, faster, cheaper: an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Equilibrium bids in practical multi-attribute auctions
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Real analysis
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