A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0334MaRDI QIDQ3115461zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini

Publication date 21 February 2012

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsauctionscombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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• Combinatorial auction design
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• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations

Cited in

(31)

• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Benefits of inter-firm relationships: application to the case of a five sawmills and one paper mill supply chain
• Pricing combinatorial auctions.
• Combinatorial auctions
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• An efficient bidding heuristic for simultaneous truckload transportation auctions
• Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• A parametrization of the auction design space
• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Scheduling with package auctions
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
• A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
• Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
• Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets
• Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case
• Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors
• Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
• Boolean networks-based auction algorithm for task assignment of multiple UAVs
• Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
• Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions

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