A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
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Publication:3115461
DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0334zbMATH Open1232.91317OpenAlexW2112959886MaRDI QIDQ3115461FDOQ3115461
Anthony M. Kwasnica, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 21 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/
Recommendations
Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cited In (31)
- Combinatorial auctions
- An efficient bidding heuristic for simultaneous truckload transportation auctions
- Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations
- Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
- Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
- Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions
- Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
- Benefits of inter-firm relationships: application to the case of a five sawmills and one paper mill supply chain
- The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
- Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case
- Scheduling with package auctions
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
- Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
- Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors
- Boolean networks-based auction algorithm for task assignment of multiple UAVs
- Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
- Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
- Pricing combinatorial auctions.
- Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
- Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
- Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
- A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- A parametrization of the auction design space
- A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
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