A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
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Publication:3115461
DOI10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334zbMath1232.91317MaRDI QIDQ3115461
John O. Ledyard, Anthony M. Kwasnica, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini
Publication date: 21 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/
90C57: Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A90: Experimental studies
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