A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0334zbMATH Open1232.91317OpenAlexW2112959886MaRDI QIDQ3115461FDOQ3115461

Anthony M. Kwasnica, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini, John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/

Recommendations

• Combinatorial auction design
• Handbook of spectrum auction design
• Design of combinatorial auctions
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsauctionscombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cited In (31)

• Combinatorial auctions
• An efficient bidding heuristic for simultaneous truckload transportation auctions
• Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
• Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Benefits of inter-firm relationships: application to the case of a five sawmills and one paper mill supply chain
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case
• Scheduling with package auctions
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
• Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors
• Boolean networks-based auction algorithm for task assignment of multiple UAVs
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• Pricing combinatorial auctions.
• Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
• Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
• Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
• A parametrization of the auction design space
• A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
• Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

This page was built for publication: A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3115461)