The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.09.048MaRDI QIDQ2030728zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Per Paulsen, Martin Bichler, Gian-Marco Kokott

Publication date 7 June 2021

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.048

zbMATH Keywords

lab experimentssplit-award auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
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• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
• Computational Science – ICCS 2005
• Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items

Cites work

• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale

Cited in

(6)

• How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions
• Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation
• The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
• Free riding in combinatorial first-price sealed-bid auctions
• The impact of partial production capacity sharing via production as a service
• Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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