Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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(91)- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
- Games played in a contracting environment
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Coalition-proof implementation
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Team selection factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors
- Dynamic common agency.
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- From private to public common agency.
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
- Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
- A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
- Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- Strategic consensus
- Competition in non-linear pricing, market concentration and mergers
- A note on low-price menu auctions
- The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
- Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations
- The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
- Buying supermajorities in the lab
- Nudge the lunch: a field experiment testing menu-primacy effects on lunch choices
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Principal-agent VCG contracts
- Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
- The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
- Competition for procurement shares
- Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Dynamic price competition
- Policy bias equivalence under common agency
- Politically connected firms and the environment
- Cross-country technology transfer and politically driven international agreements for environmental standards
- On organization of markets of homogeneous goods
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Common agency with caring agents
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
- First price package auction with many traders
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- Subsidization and bargaining in mixed oligopolies
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
- Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Competitive contract design in a retail supply chain under demand uncertainty
- An integrated approach for allocation and scheduling-location problems on graphs
- Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
- Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting
- An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
- Environmental tax competition and welfare: the good news about lobbies
- Contractual chains
- Fisher-Schultz lecture: contracting over pharmaceutical formularies and rebates
- Comment on: ``Fisher-Schultz lecture: contracting over pharmaceutical formularies and rebates by Kate Ho and Robin Lee
- The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions
- Monetary policy committees, independence, and influence
- Buyer groups as strategic commitments
- Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
- On the accessibility of core-extensions
- Common agency with risk-averse agent
- Transparency and special interests
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Reciprocal contracting
- Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
- Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
- Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Bargaining with a property rights owner
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