Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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(87)- Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
- Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
- Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data
- Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
- Contractual chains
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- Common agency with risk-averse agent
- Transparency and special interests
- Strategic consensus
- Coalition-proof implementation
- Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters
- Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
- On the accessibility of core-extensions
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Dynamic common agency.
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Bargaining with a property rights owner
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
- A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries
- Principal-agent VCG contracts
- Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Buying supermajorities in the lab
- The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- From private to public common agency.
- The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry
- Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
- Policy bias equivalence under common agency
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
- Politically connected firms and the environment
- The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
- Dynamic price competition
- Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting
- A note on low-price menu auctions
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
- Buyer groups as strategic commitments
- Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
- Nudge the lunch: a field experiment testing menu-primacy effects on lunch choices
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Competition in non-linear pricing, market concentration and mergers
- Competitive contract design in a retail supply chain under demand uncertainty
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
- Subsidization and bargaining in mixed oligopolies
- Common agency with caring agents
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
- On organization of markets of homogeneous goods
- A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
- Competition for procurement shares
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
- Reciprocal contracting
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Games played in a contracting environment
- Environmental tax competition and welfare: the good news about lobbies
- First price package auction with many traders
- Team selection factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors
- An integrated approach for allocation and scheduling-location problems on graphs
- Cross-country technology transfer and politically driven international agreements for environmental standards
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