Common agency with risk-averse agent

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.06.009zbMATH Open1197.91133OpenAlexW2130233432MaRDI QIDQ845014FDOQ845014

Authors: Aggey Semenov 

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6991/1/MPRA_paper_6991.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationrisk-aversioncommon agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry

Cited In (3)

• Optimal screening by risk-averse principals
• Common agency with caring agents
• Common Agency

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