The pluralistic view of politics: asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.02.036MaRDI QIDQ1934166zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Martimort, Aggey Semenov

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16187/1/martimort_semenov2.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common agencylobbypluralistic politics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

Cited in

(6)

• A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Common agency with risk-averse agent
• Transparency and special interests

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