Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.009zbMath1419.91260OpenAlexW2582907277WikidataQ129001856 ScholiaQ129001856MaRDI QIDQ1735766

Paolo Roberti

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/5454/1/WP1085.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votinglobbyingcitizen-candidate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
• Political Motivations
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• A Political Theory of Populism *
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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