A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
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Publication:5687758
DOI10.2307/2946658zbMath0870.90041OpenAlexW2159823353MaRDI QIDQ5687758
Al Slivinski, Martin J. Osborne
Publication date: 22 January 1997
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2795d008d29bbecb4e4ba6e7a9f92cd066e36d18
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