Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.002MaRDI QIDQ1007330zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arnaud Dellis

Publication date 20 March 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingvoting ruleselectoral competitioncitizen-candidate modelBorda Countpolicy moderation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
• Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
• Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
• Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
• Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
• Practical multi-candidate election system
• Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
• How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
• On multilevel voting

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

Cited in

(9)

• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
• Moderating government
• Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
• Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
• Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
• Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?

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