Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
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Publication:1007330
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.002zbMATH Open1157.91330OpenAlexW3123242266MaRDI QIDQ1007330FDOQ1007330
Authors: Arnaud Dellis 
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.002
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- On multilevel voting
Cites Work
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
- Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Electoral Systems and Public Spending
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
Cited In (9)
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Moderating government
- Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
- Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
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