Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House

DOI10.1162/0033553041502153zbMath1074.91513OpenAlexW2150403403WikidataQ56706020 ScholiaQ56706020MaRDI QIDQ4662749

Enrico Moretti, Matthew J. Butler, David S. Lee

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2a612b63451ba2c6fdbff635ffb13d35eda77c5a

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Regression discontinuity designs: a guide to practice ⋮ Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections ⋮ Model uncertainty and model averaging in regression discontinuity designs ⋮ Solving the classification problem using \(\varepsilon\)-nets ⋮ Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model ⋮ The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice ⋮ Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection ⋮ Estimation and inference in regression discontinuity designs with asymmetric kernels ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

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