Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model
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Abstract: In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.
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Cites work
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
- Informative cheap talk in elections
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
- Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
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