Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model

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Publication:2157287

DOI10.1007/S40505-022-00220-8zbMATH Open1497.91258arXiv2107.07910OpenAlexW3183840738MaRDI QIDQ2157287FDOQ2157287


Authors: Yanyan Li Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 27 July 2022

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.07910




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