Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model

DOI10.1007/S40505-022-00220-8zbMath1497.91258arXiv2107.07910OpenAlexW3183840738MaRDI QIDQ2157287

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 27 July 2022

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.07910

zbMATH Keywords

political competitioncredibility and commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• Informative Cheap Talk in Elections
• Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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