A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
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Publication:1360948
DOI10.1007/s003550050076zbMath0881.90032OpenAlexW1541524004MaRDI QIDQ1360948
Publication date: 23 July 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5498
Related Items (16)
Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ Poisson voting games under proportional rule ⋮ Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties ⋮ A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria ⋮ Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output ⋮ Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms ⋮ Extreme parties and political rents ⋮ Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention ⋮ Endogenous institutions and political extremism ⋮ Power sharing and electoral equilibrium ⋮ Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case ⋮ On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Voting with preferences over margins of victory ⋮ Strategic vote trading under complete information ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation
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