Endogenous institutions and political extremism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.04.006zbMath1281.91137OpenAlexW2067783597MaRDI QIDQ2436298

Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

institutionsextremismrepressiondemocratic consolidation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition
• Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
• A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Voting on Majority Rules
• The Political Economy of Indirect Control *
• A Political Theory of Populism *
• The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear

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