Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

DOI10.1162/003355300554836MaRDI QIDQ4495449zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew Ellman, Leonard Wantchekon

Publication date 4 March 2001

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1155

zbMATH Keywords

electionsplatform divergencethreat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
• Electoral competition under imperfect information
• Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• A dynamic theory of electoral competition

Cited in

(8)

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
• How elections are impacted by production, economic growth and conflict
• Moderation of an ideological party
• Political disagreement and information in elections
• Organized crime, violence, and politics
• Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
• Endogenous institutions and political extremism

This page was built for publication: Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4495449)