Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
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Publication:2431827
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0111-5zbMATH Open1180.91095OpenAlexW2155155965MaRDI QIDQ2431827FDOQ2431827
Authors: Humberto Llavador
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/937
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- A Theory of Divided Government
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
- Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest
Cited In (7)
- Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics.
- Voting with preferences over margins of victory
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- Extreme parties and political rents
- The ``invisible hand of vote markets
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
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