Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
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Publication:2431827
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Cites work
- A Theory of Divided Government
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
- Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
- Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
Cited in
(8)- Voting with preferences over margins of victory
- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- Extreme parties and political rents
- Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics.
- The ``invisible hand of vote markets
- The impact of voter uncertainty and alienation on turnout and candidate policy choice
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- Polling in a proportional representation system
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