Strategic vote trading under complete information
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Publication:1800968
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.07.009zbMATH Open1416.91103OpenAlexW2739728576WikidataQ129405304 ScholiaQ129405304MaRDI QIDQ1800968FDOQ1800968
Authors: Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros 
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/03-17.pdf
Recommendations
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- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading
- Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Vote trading and subset sums
- Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting
Cites Work
- Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Existence of competitive equilibria with externalities: a differential viewpoint
- Optimal voting rules
- One man, one bid
- A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
- Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
Cited In (8)
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