Trading votes for votes: a laboratory study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.004MaRDI QIDQ1995456zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alessandra Casella, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/106434/

zbMATH Keywords

votingexperimentslogrollingvote trading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

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Cites work

• A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• The farsighted stable set
• Trading votes for votes. A dynamic theory
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Cited in

(5)

• An experimental study of storable votes
• Trading votes for votes. A dynamic theory
• Vote trading in public elections
• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
• The ``invisible hand of vote markets

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE

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