Vote trading in public elections

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.004zbMATH Open1141.91372OpenAlexW1981436672MaRDI QIDQ855754FDOQ855754

David Hartvigsen

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

integer programmingknapsack problemvoting strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Integer programming (90C10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Maximizing Submodular Set Functions: Formulations and Analysis of Algorithms
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• How hard is it to control an election?
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

Cited In (5)

• On avoiding vote swapping
• Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• Vote trading and subset sums

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