Vote trading in public elections

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.004MaRDI QIDQ855754zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Hartvigsen

Publication date 7 December 2006

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

integer programmingknapsack problemvoting strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Integer programming (90C10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Trading votes for votes. A dynamic theory
• Strategic vote trading under complete information
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44282 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Maximizing Submodular Set Functions: Formulations and Analysis of Algorithms
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election

Cited in

(8)

• Trading votes for votes: a laboratory study
• Trading votes for votes. A dynamic theory
• On avoiding vote swapping
• Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• Vote trading and subset sums
• The ``invisible hand of vote markets

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