Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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DOI10.1007/BF00303169zbMATH Open0672.90004MaRDI QIDQ1120433FDOQ1120433
Authors: John J. III Bartholdi, Craig A. Tovey, Michael A. Trick 
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
Cites Work
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Ranking and drawing in subexponential time
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
- A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
- Optimizing the cost of preference manipulation in the graph model for conflict resolution
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Mining maximum consensus sequences from group ranking data
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Ranking chain sum orders
- NP-hardness results for the aggregation of linear orders into median orders
- Approaching rank aggregation problems by using evolution strategies: the case of the optimal bucket order problem
- Vote trading in public elections
- A new correlation coefficient for comparing and aggregating non-strict and incomplete rankings
- Partial kernelization for rank aggregation: theory and experiments
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- On the computation of median linear orders, of median complete preorders and of median weak orders
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- Improved parameterized algorithms for the Kemeny aggregation problem
- On the complexity of crossings in permutations
- Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
- Using extension sets to aggregate partial rankings in a flexible setting
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
- An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Kernels for feedback arc set in tournaments
- Computing the minimal covering set
- Approximate Condorcet partitioning: solving large-scale rank aggregation problems
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
- Finding socially best spanning treesî
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- On the hardness of maximum rank aggregation problems
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
- Experiments with Kemeny ranking: What works when?
- Average parameterization and partial kernelization for computing medians
- A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- Complexity results for extensions of median orders to different types of remoteness
- Comparing and Aggregating Partially Resolved Trees
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
- Efficient algorithms using subiterative convergence for Kemeny ranking problem
- Label ranking by learning pairwise preferences
- Comparing and aggregating partially resolved trees
- Popular spanning trees
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Comparing and aggregating partial orders with Kendall tau distances
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
- Computer science and decision theory
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Median linear orders: Heuristics and a branch and bound algorithm
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
- Computing kemeny rankings from \(d\)-Euclidean preferences
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms
- Reducing the time required to find the Kemeny ranking by exploiting a necessary condition for being a winner
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
- Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: a setwise Kemeny aggregation problem
- Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
- On the difficulty of making social choices
- A note on generalized rank aggregation
- Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
- Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- The network HHD: quantifying cyclic competition in trait-performance models of tournaments
- Probabilistic preference learning with the Mallows rank model
- Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules
- Collective decision making
- A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules
- Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- Correlation clustering with constrained cluster sizes and extended weights bounds
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