Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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Publication:1120433
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- A Cutting Plane Algorithm for the Linear Ordering Problem
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
- The Voting Problem
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
- Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections: Lewis Carroll's 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to NP
- Byzantine preferential voting
- Predicting winner and estimating margin of victory in elections using sampling
- Beyond the worst case: semi-random complexity analysis of winner determination
- Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model
- Collective schedules: axioms and algorithms
- Popular spanning trees
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
- Comparing and aggregating partial orders with Kendall tau distances
- Computer science and decision theory
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Approaching the rank aggregation problem by local search-based metaheuristics
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
- Median linear orders: Heuristics and a branch and bound algorithm
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Fixed-Parameter Algorithms for Kemeny Scores
- An algorithm for rank aggregation problem
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Preferences single-peaked on a tree: multiwinner elections and structural results
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
- Randomized algorithms for lexicographic inference
- Parameterized aspects of distinct Kemeny rank aggregation
- Computing kemeny rankings from \(d\)-Euclidean preferences
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Ranking and drawing in subexponential time
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Reducing the time required to find the Kemeny ranking by exploiting a necessary condition for being a winner
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
- Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
- Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: a setwise Kemeny aggregation problem
- A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
- Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Mining maximum consensus sequences from group ranking data
- Optimizing the cost of preference manipulation in the graph model for conflict resolution
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- On the difficulty of making social choices
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- A note on generalized rank aggregation
- Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
- Ranking chain sum orders
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective
- Approaching rank aggregation problems by using evolution strategies: the case of the optimal bucket order problem
- NP-hardness results for the aggregation of linear orders into median orders
- The network HHD: quantifying cyclic competition in trait-performance models of tournaments
- Vote trading in public elections
- Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules
- Probabilistic preference learning with the Mallows rank model
- A new correlation coefficient for comparing and aggregating non-strict and incomplete rankings
- Partial kernelization for rank aggregation: theory and experiments
- Collective decision making
- On the computation of median linear orders, of median complete preorders and of median weak orders
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- On the complexity of crossings in permutations
- Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
- Improved parameterized algorithms for the Kemeny aggregation problem
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Approximate and dynamic rank aggregation
- Correlation clustering with constrained cluster sizes and extended weights bounds
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4138842 (Why is no real title available?)
- It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
- Recursive inversion models for permutations
- Using extension sets to aggregate partial rankings in a flexible setting
- An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
- An algorithmic view of voting
- Voting rules as error-correcting codes
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Kernels for feedback arc set in tournaments
- Computing the minimal covering set
- Parameterized aspects of distinct Kemeny rank aggregation
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