Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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Publication:1120433
DOI10.1007/BF00303169zbMath0672.90004MaRDI QIDQ1120433
Craig A. Tovey, Michael A. Trick, John J. III Bartholdi
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
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