Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
A Cutting Plane Algorithm for the Linear Ordering Problem
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
The Voting Problem
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

Cited in

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Computing kemeny rankings from \(d\)-Euclidean preferences
A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
Ranking and drawing in subexponential time
Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
On stable rules for selecting committees
Reducing the time required to find the Kemeny ranking by exploiting a necessary condition for being a winner
On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms
Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
Beyond pairwise comparisons in social choice: a setwise Kemeny aggregation problem
A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
The complexity of Kemeny elections
The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
Voting procedures, complexity of
Mining maximum consensus sequences from group ranking data
Optimizing the cost of preference manipulation in the graph model for conflict resolution
The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
On the difficulty of making social choices
Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
A note on generalized rank aggregation
Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
Ranking chain sum orders
Approximability of Dodgson's rule
Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective
Approaching rank aggregation problems by using evolution strategies: the case of the optimal bucket order problem
NP-hardness results for the aggregation of linear orders into median orders
The network HHD: quantifying cyclic competition in trait-performance models of tournaments
Vote trading in public elections
Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules
Probabilistic preference learning with the Mallows rank model
A new correlation coefficient for comparing and aggregating non-strict and incomplete rankings
Partial kernelization for rank aggregation: theory and experiments
Collective decision making
On the computation of median linear orders, of median complete preorders and of median weak orders
Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
The complexity of priced control in elections
Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
On the complexity of crossings in permutations
Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
Improved parameterized algorithms for the Kemeny aggregation problem
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
Approximate and dynamic rank aggregation
Correlation clustering with constrained cluster sizes and extended weights bounds
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
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It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
Recursive inversion models for permutations
Using extension sets to aggregate partial rankings in a flexible setting
An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
An algorithmic view of voting
Voting rules as error-correcting codes
Dichotomy for voting systems
Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
Kernels for feedback arc set in tournaments
Computing the minimal covering set
Parameterized aspects of distinct Kemeny rank aggregation
An axiomatic distance methodology for aggregating multimodal evaluations
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
Voting: a machine learning approach
Approximate Condorcet partitioning: solving large-scale rank aggregation problems
Finding socially best spanning treesî
How hard is it to control an election?
Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
Aggregation over metric spaces: proposing and voting in elections, budgeting, and legislation
The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
On the hardness of maximum rank aggregation problems
The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
On weakly and strongly popular rankings
Experiments with Kemeny ranking: What works when?
Average parameterization and partial kernelization for computing medians
A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
Complexity results for extensions of median orders to different types of remoteness
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
Efficient algorithms using subiterative convergence for Kemeny ranking problem
The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
Comparing and Aggregating Partially Resolved Trees
Comparing and aggregating partially resolved trees
Label ranking by learning pairwise preferences

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