Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2015.06.016zbMath1328.68097OpenAlexW1866078091MaRDI QIDQ2354767
Feng Shi, Min Yang, Weimin Su, Jianxin Wang, Jiong Guo, Qilong Feng, Jian'er Chen
Publication date: 24 July 2015
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.06.016
computational social choiceparameterized complexityproblem kernelsstrategic behaviors of voting protocols
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
Cites Work
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