Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
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Cited in
(82)- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1024093 (Why is no real title available?)
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