Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
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Publication:3651465
DOI10.1613/jair.2697zbMath1180.91091OpenAlexW2124562173WikidataQ129499994 ScholiaQ129499994MaRDI QIDQ3651465
Jörg Rothe, Hemaspaandra, Lane A., Edith Hemaspaandra, Piotr Faliszewski
Publication date: 10 December 2009
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2697
Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
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