Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
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Publication:2290364
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Cites work
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
- Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 610968 (Why is no real title available?)
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
- Parameterized algorithms
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Proportional approval voting, harmonic \(k\)-median, and negative association
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness radius for Chamberlin-Courant on restricted domains
- The complexity of computing the permanent
- When does approval voting make the ``right choices?
Cited in
(8)- Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness of participatory budgeting outcomes: complexity and experiments
- On the complexity of destructive bribery in approval-based multiwinner voting
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