Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
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Publication:2829679
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6zbMath1348.91104OpenAlexW967083285MaRDI QIDQ2829679
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6
Related Items (25)
Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Approval elections with a variable number of winners ⋮ Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation ⋮ Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem ⋮ Justified representation in approval-based committee voting ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany ⋮ FPT approximation schemes for maximizing submodular functions ⋮ On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations ⋮ Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives ⋮ The space of all proportional voting systems and the most majoritarian among them ⋮ Structured proportional representation ⋮ Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting ⋮ Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation ⋮ Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting ⋮ The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections ⋮ Proportional Approval Voting, Harmonic k-median, and Negative Association ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result ⋮ Voting on multi-issue domains with conditionally lexicographic preferences ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints
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