Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
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Publication:2829679
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6zbMATH Open1348.91104OpenAlexW967083285MaRDI QIDQ2829679FDOQ2829679
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_6
Cites Work
Cited In (33)
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- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting
- Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
- Approval voting in subset elections
- Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation
- The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections
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