Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
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Publication:2829680
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_7zbMath1348.91105OpenAlexW120949863MaRDI QIDQ2829680
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_7
Related Items (2)
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
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