Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
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Publication:2829680
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Cites work
- A strong paradox of multiple elections
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
- Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
- Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- Partially monotonic bargaining solutions
- Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
- The paradox of multiple elections
- Voting paradoxes and referenda
Cited in
(7)- Collective approval
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
- Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- Describing society through approval data
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
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