Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_7MaRDI QIDQ2829680zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lainé, Jean, Gilbert Laffond

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
• Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
• Approval elections with a variable number of winners
• Collective approval
• Handbook on approval voting

Cites work

• A strong paradox of multiple elections
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
• Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
• Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
• Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
• Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
• How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
• On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
• Partially monotonic bargaining solutions
• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• The paradox of multiple elections
• Voting paradoxes and referenda

Cited in

(7)

• Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
• Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
• Collective approval
• Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
• Describing society through approval data
• Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections

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