Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
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Publication:2568844
Recommendations
- Complexities of electing diverse committees
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting by Committees
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees
Cited in
(21)- Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Condorcet winning sets
- Committees with leaks
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
- Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
- Method of generating functions for procedure of committee electing
- Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
- Complexities of electing diverse committees
- Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences
- Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations
- Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections
- Paradoxical oddities in two multiwinner elections from Scotland
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
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