Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
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Publication:2568844
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0209-yzbMath1073.91548OpenAlexW2033267281MaRDI QIDQ2568844
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0209-y
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