Condorcet winning sets
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Publication:2341123
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4zbMath1318.91066OpenAlexW2042523999MaRDI QIDQ2341123
Edith Elkind, Abdallah Saffidine, Jérôme Lang
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4
Related Items (7)
On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection ⋮ It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree ⋮ Justified representation in approval-based committee voting ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
Cites Work
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- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
- The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
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