A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.005zbMath1393.91054OpenAlexW2792753607MaRDI QIDQ1642162

Andreas Darmann

Publication date: 20 June 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceCondorcet criterionBorda scoresordinal group activity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints ⋮ On weakly and strongly popular rankings ⋮ Stability and welfare in (dichotomous) hedonic diversity games ⋮ Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice ⋮ Hedonic diversity games revisited ⋮ Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences

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