How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.06.004MaRDI QIDQ459394zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Andreas Darmann

Publication date 8 October 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.06.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Recommendations

• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections
• Electing a committee with dominance constraints

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Committee Selection with a Weight Constraint Based on a Pairwise Dominance Relation
• Committee selection under weight constraints
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
• On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The Rectilinear Steiner Tree Problem is $NP$-Complete
• Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Yes-no voting

Cited in

(10)

• Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences
• Electing a committee with dominance constraints
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• A note on the query complexity of the Condorcet winner problem
• Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections
• Coincidence of Condorcet committees
• It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
• A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
• Aggregation over metric spaces: proposing and voting in elections, budgeting, and legislation

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