Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.05.002zbMATH Open1177.91068OpenAlexW3125944074WikidataQ61638348 ScholiaQ61638348MaRDI QIDQ732928FDOQ732928
Authors: Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler, Ulrich Pferschy 
Publication date: 15 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.05.002
Recommendations
Social choice (91B14) Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
Cites Work
- Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
- Robust discrete optimization and its applications
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- Basic Geometry of Voting
- The complexity of satisfiability problems
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- On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
- Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
- Characterizations of the plurality function
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- Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
- Approximating Min-Max (Regret) Versions of Some Polynomial Problems
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
Cited In (8)
- Collective decision making
- Committee selection under weight constraints
- POPULAR SPANNING TREES
- A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Finding socially best spanning treesî
- Collective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation
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