Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
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Publication:930485
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0270-ZzbMATH Open1142.91416OpenAlexW2088844807MaRDI QIDQ930485FDOQ930485
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z
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Cites Work
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Voting by Committees
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- The Borda count and agenda manipulation
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
- Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
Cited In (7)
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
- Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: Indirect scoring procedures
- Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
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