Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.12.003MaRDI QIDQ2452812zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Adam Giles, Peter Postl

Publication date 5 June 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://opus.bath.ac.uk/38248/1/ScoringMSSFinalDec13.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Approaches to collective decision making with fuzzy preference relations
• Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient compromising
• Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3482039 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiencies on linking decisions
• On the justice of decision rules
• Ordinal Ranking with Intensity of Preference
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Strategy-proof compromises
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

Cited in

(10)

• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
• Optimal scoring cutoff policies and efficient frontiers
• A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
• Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

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