The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:765225
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.002zbMath1279.91065OpenAlexW2098225016WikidataQ56387584 ScholiaQ56387584MaRDI QIDQ765225
Thomas Tröger, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32716/1/MPRA_paper_32716.pdf
Related Items
PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Information aggregation with a continuum of types ⋮ Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Condorcet meets Bentham ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision ⋮ Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient compromising
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Storable votes
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Voting on Majority Rules
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
