The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.002zbMATH Open1279.91065OpenAlexW2098225016WikidataQ56387584 ScholiaQ56387584MaRDI QIDQ765225FDOQ765225

Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz, Thomas Tröger 

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32716/1/MPRA_paper_32716.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleutilitarianismmechanism designcorrelated values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Efficient compromising
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Storable votes
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Voting on Majority Rules

Cited In (26)

• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• A general concept of majority rule
• Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• Preferences for harmony and minority voting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
• The price of `one person, one vote'
• All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
• POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Asymptotic efficiency of majority rule relative to rank-sum method for selecting the best population
• The majoritarian compromise in large societies
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Determining the majority: The biased case
• On the justice of decision rules
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Information aggregation with a continuum of types

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