Majority rule when voters like to win

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.01.002MaRDI QIDQ2519477zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven Callander

Publication date 26 January 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

conformityinformation aggregationstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
• Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• The wisdom of the minority
• Voting as Communicating

Cited in

(23)

• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• Majority vote following a debate
• Social choice by majority rule with rational participation
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case
• On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
• Conformity preferences and information gathering effort in collective decision making
• Voter conformism and inefficient policies
• Optimal majority rule in referenda
• On the consensus effect
• Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
• A passion for voting
• Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
• How majorities can lose the election: another voting paradox
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Full information equivalence in large elections
• Aggregation of antagonistic contingent preferences: when is it possible?
• Can the majority lose the election?

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