Information efficiency and majority decisions

DOI10.1007/BF00186280MaRDI QIDQ1908526zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach

Publication date 2 September 1996

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00186280

zbMATH Keywords

characterization of equilibriaprivate information acquisitiontwo-stage voting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Voting on tricky questions
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Majority rule when voters like to win

Cited in

(7)

• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting
• The value of public information in majority decisions
• Information acquisition in committees
• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• When can an outsider bribe voters one by one at a negligible cost?

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