Rational ignorance and voting behavior
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Recommendations
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- Rationalizable voting
- Rational voters in a partisanship model
- A theory of rational choice under ignorance
- Preferences under ignorance
- The Politics of Persuasion when Voters Are Rational
- Collective decision under ignorance
- Ignorance and competence in choices under uncertainty
Cites work
Cited in
(20)- Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
- Information aggregation, growth, and franchise extension with applications to female enfranchisement and inequality
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Political decision making with costly and imperfect information
- A passion for voting
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
- Information efficiency and majority decisions
- Rational voters in a partisanship model
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
- Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Rationalizable voting
- Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- Committee design with endogenous participation
- Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
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