Rational ignorance and voting behavior

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0051-4MaRDI QIDQ870760zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors César Martinelli

Publication date 15 March 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0051-4

zbMATH Keywords

voting theoryrational ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?

Cited in

(20)

• Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
• Information aggregation, growth, and franchise extension with applications to female enfranchisement and inequality
• On the drawbacks of large committees
• Political decision making with costly and imperfect information
• A passion for voting
• Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
• Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Rational voters in a partisanship model
• The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
• Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Rationalizable voting
• Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
• Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
• Committee design with endogenous participation
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence

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