Rational ignorance and voting behavior

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0051-4MaRDI QIDQ870760zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors César Martinelli

Publication date 15 March 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0051-4

zbMATH Keywords

rational ignorancevoting theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Review text

In a previous paper by the author, a pivotal voter model in which it was predicted that in equilibria with information acquisition every voter was nearly uninformed, and the aggregate cost information acquisition was declined to zero when information aggregation was successful was formulated and analyzed. The model in this paper, per contra, predicts that there will be a minority of voters with much better information that the rest, and that the aggregate cost of information acquisition will grow unboundedly when information aggregation is more successful.

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Cites work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?

Cited in

(21)

• Political decision making with costly and imperfect information
• Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
• Rational voters in a partisanship model
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
• A passion for voting
• On the drawbacks of large committees
• Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
• The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
• Rationalizable voting
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
• Committee design with endogenous participation
• Information aggregation, growth, and franchise extension with applications to female enfranchisement and inequality
• Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
• Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?

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