Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.006zbMath1419.91565OpenAlexW2914305988WikidataQ128455391 ScholiaQ128455391MaRDI QIDQ1735805

Jørgen Juel Andersen, Tom-Reiel Heggedal

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

political equilibriumvoter turnoutinformation searchpolitical rents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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