Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.008zbMATH Open1498.91343OpenAlexW4282041903MaRDI QIDQ2675433FDOQ2675433
Authors: Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland, Rebecca B. Morton 
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.008
Recommendations
- A duopoly model of political agency with applications to anti-corruption reform
- Competition of politicians for wages and office
- Competition of politicians for wages and office
- On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
- On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector
History, political science (91F10) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Cites Work
- Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Regular quantal response equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium. A stochastic theory of games
- Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
- Elections with platform and valence competition
- Price floors and competition
- Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets
- Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the US
- Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
- Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
- Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
Cited In (4)
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2675433)
