Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.008MaRDI QIDQ2675433zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland, Rebecca B. Morton

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentelectoral competitionpolitical rents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets
• Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
• Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
• Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the US
• Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
• Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
• Price floors and competition
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Quantal response equilibrium. A stochastic theory of games
• Regular quantal response equilibrium

Cited in

(4)

• A duopoly model of political agency with applications to anti-corruption reform
• Competition of politicians for wages and office
• Competition of politicians for wages and office
• Does quality of openness affect corruption?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• Z-Tree

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