On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.12.020MaRDI QIDQ498829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ritwik Banerjee, Tushi Baul, Tanya Rosenblat

Publication date 29 September 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/84167319/wp15_01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bureaucracycorruptionexperiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• Framing of incentives and effort provision
• Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

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(4)

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• Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
• Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

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