Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
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Publication:842817
DOI10.1007/S10683-008-9207-3zbMath1170.91320OpenAlexW2158843260MaRDI QIDQ842817
Vivi Alatas, Ananish Chaudhuri, Lisa Cameron, Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan
Publication date: 25 September 2009
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/34442
Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (5)
Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students ⋮ The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence ⋮ On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector ⋮ Lab-sophistication: does repeated participation in laboratory experiments affect pro-social behaviour? ⋮ The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Cites Work
- Demographics and behaviour
- Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
- Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
- On perceptions of fairness: the role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
- Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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