The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence

DOI10.3390/g7020013zbMath1403.91089OpenAlexW2471213140MaRDI QIDQ1651859

Erwann Sbai, Tirnud Paichayontvijit, Ananish Chaudhuri

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020013

zbMATH Keywords

experimentspunishmentcorruptionframingbribes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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