Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-7053-8zbMATH Open1151.91640OpenAlexW2077511828WikidataQ56267080 ScholiaQ56267080MaRDI QIDQ862846FDOQ862846

Authors: C. Bram Cadsby, Elizabeth Maynes, Viswanath Umashanker Trivedi 

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7053-8

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zbMATH Keywords

ComplianceExperimentEvasionObedienceTax

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cited In (9)

• Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion
• The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
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• TAX EVASION AND STATE PRODUCTIVITY-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
• Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
• Can behavioral ``nudges improve compliance? The case of Colombia social protection contributions
• Learning (not) to evade taxes
• Taxation with mobile high-income agents: experimental evidence on tax compliance and equity perceptions

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