Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-7053-8MaRDI QIDQ862846zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors C. Bram Cadsby, Elizabeth Maynes, Viswanath Umashanker Trivedi

Publication date 24 January 2007

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7053-8

zbMATH Keywords

ComplianceExperimentEvasionObedienceTax

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Experimental studies (91A90)

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