Learning (not) to evade taxes

DOI10.3390/G10040038zbMATH Open1435.91055OpenAlexW2978329352MaRDI QIDQ2307367FDOQ2307367

Authors Aloys L. Prinz

Publication date 27 March 2020

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040038

zbMATH Keywords

experimentstax complianceall-or-nothing decision makingdeterministic and stochastic learningdiscrete decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44217 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
• What does ``clean really mean? The implicit framing of decontextualized experiments

Cited in

(5)

• The difficulty of beating the Taxman
• Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion
• TAX EVASION AND STATE PRODUCTIVITY-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
• Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
• Learning Ricardian equivalence

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