Learning (not) to evade taxes

DOI10.3390/G10040038MaRDI QIDQ2307367zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aloys L. Prinz

Publication date 27 March 2020

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g10040038

zbMATH Keywords

experimentstax complianceall-or-nothing decision makingdeterministic and stochastic learningdiscrete decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers
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• Learning in games with risky payoffs

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44217 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
• What does ``clean really mean? The implicit framing of decontextualized experiments

Cited in

(5)

• The difficulty of beating the Taxman
• Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion
• TAX EVASION AND STATE PRODUCTIVITY-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
• Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach
• Learning Ricardian equivalence

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